The closure of the Hawaiian longline swordfish fishery over the period [2001][2002][2003][2004], which was motivated by the protection of endangered sea turtles, created the elements of a natural experiment that allows identification of the market transfer of catch (and sea turtle by-catch) to other regions. This paper exploits the fact that the vessels in the Hawaiian longline fishery sell their catch in the US fresh swordfish market to analyze the pattern of changes in US fresh and frozen swordfish consumption both before and after the closure regulation was imposed. The mechanisms by which any unintended consequences on endangered sea turtles in other fishery locations in the world are shown to take place through the US swordfish market. At the estimated annual market transfer, a bootstrap analysis of the probability distribution of by-catch rates indicates that the regulation led to an additional 2,882 sea turtle interactions at the sample means. 1
Introduction
Environmental regulations can have both intended and unintended effects. One type of unintended effect, known as market transfer effect, occurs when regional regulation to control externalities in one market leads to increased market production and environmental damages in another market. Given the current trend towards globalization of markets, regionalized environmental policies may alter trade flows with little effect on global production. The market transfer effect of regional environmental regulations has the potential to increase global environmental damages when, for example, the market transfer arises from a ban on production in a relatively "clean", regulated economy that shifts production to countries with little environmental controls. This paper examines the market transfer effect of endangered sea turtle bycatch as a result of the closure of the Hawaiian pelagic longline swordfish fishery. Pelagic longlining, which is the most common method for targeting large swordfish for high-end fresh markets in the US, operates by attaching baited hooks to a horizontal line held afloat by buoys. These lines stretch up to a hundred kilometers across the ocean and are set at a shallow depth that facilitates the incidental bycatch of endangered sea turtles. In April 2001, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) entirely closed the shallow-set (swordfish-target) component of the Hawaiibased longline fishery in order to reduce the adverse effects of incidental bycatch on sea turtle populations. 1 Prior to the closure, the Hawaiian fishery distributed its product in the fresh segment of the swordfish market and represented 42% of the US swordfish catch and 19% of total US fresh swordfish consumption [1, 2] . This closure, which impacted fresh swordfish supply but not frozen swordfish supply, forms the foundation for an experiment that allows the market transfer effect to be econometrically estimated for the shift in swordfish catch (and turtle bycatch) to other regions as a result of the regulation.
Not surprisingly, the rate at which various fisheries lead to the unintended death or injury of endangered sea turtles varies greatly, and this variation is at least in part attributable to differing degrees of fishery management and monitoring. For instance, over the period 1994-2001 preceding the closure of the Hawaii longline swordfish fishery, sea turtle bycatch rate averaged 0.17 turtles per mt of swordfish caught, whereas estimates for other major producers range from 0.8 and 1.2 turtles per mt of swordfish caught in Uruguay, 23.2 turtles per mt of swordfish in Brazil [4] , and 1.58 turtles per mt of swordfish in South Africa [5] . Given both the wide variation in international bycatch rates and the trend towards freer global trade, understanding the magnitude of market transfer effects from regulation of the Hawaiian pelagic longline swordfish fishery is essential.
But pointing out the possibility of market transfer effects and quantifying them are two very different things. The estimation of market transfer effects, in general, is confounded by a number of variables. First, apart from regulation, there may be a high degree of annual variation in global production. Second, demand for the regulated good may change at the same time that the regulation takes place, particularly in cases where consumers are sensitive to an environmental issue, as may be the case of warnings about mercury levels in swordfish. And third, the regulated region often represents a small fraction of the global market, which confounds the identification of global changes that can be attributed to a regulation that constrains regional supply.
The closure of the Hawaiian longline swordfish fishery represents a unique opportunity to measure market transfer effects for two reasons. First, prior to the regulation, the Hawaiian longline fishery represented a substantial share of both the US swordfish catch and of total US fresh swordfish consumption [6, 7] . Given the limitations on catch prevailing in the US Atlantic fishery, removing the Hawaiian catch from the US market led to substantial variation in the pattern of US swordfish trade. Second, and more fundamentally, US consumption of swordfish occurs in both a fresh and a frozen segment while the Hawaiian industry provides only fresh swordfish supply. This allows outside effects that influence US swordfish demand, for instance decreased demand over time resulting from Food and Drug Administration warnings regarding mercury levels in swordfish beginning in 2001, to identify the change in the quantity of fresh swordfish demanded that occurred as a result of the Hawaiian closure.
Our empirical approach is framed as follows. First, we utilize the fresh and frozen components of the US consumer market to identify the magnitude of the market transfer effect in US swordfish imports. The separation of the two markets, fresh and frozen, allows a balanced panel for which Hawaiian swordfish closure impacts are entirely in the fresh market and the treatment group is whatever regions of the world filled the gap in the US fresh swordfish market through their exports to the US. Second, we examine the pattern of US swordfish imports and use this data to bootstrap the probability distribution of the market transfer to various fisheries outside the US as a result of the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] Hawaiian fishery closure. Finally, we examine comparative bycatch rates for the Hawaii-based fishery and the shallow-set fisheries identified by the bootstrap analysis to provide a measure of the likely impact of sea turtle protective measures in Hawaii on overall sea turtle mortality. Our main finding is that the restriction of fishing effort in the Hawaii-based shallow-set longline fishery resulted in an estimated transfer of 1,602 mt of swordfish catch to non-US fisheries. At the comparative bycatch rates indicated for those regions benefiting from the transfer of swordfish production, the market transfer effect of the regulation led to an additional 2,882 sea turtle interactions at the sample means, with significant adverse impact on sea turtle injuries and mortality.
Background: The Swordfish Market in the 1990s
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Atlantic was the primary US swordfish fishery. This changed in 1990 as a result of swordfish fishing restrictions recommended by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) [8, pp.92-93] . In response to the ICCAT report, in June 1991, the US established a total allowable catch (TAC) limit of 4,163 metric tons and set a minimum size limit of 25 kg per fish [9] , which caused a dramatic decline in swordfish landings. Between 1990 and 1991, US Atlantic landings dropped from 6,603 mt to 3,551 mt (46%) and the ten-year average of US Atlantic landings fell from 4,196 mt per year over the period 1981 to 1990 to 2,547 mt per year (39%) over the period 1991 to 2000 [10] .
The decline in swordfish catch in the US Atlantic fishery was countered by a simultaneous increase in swordfish catch in the US Pacific fishery (see Figure 1 ). In the ten years before the regulation, the US Atlantic fishery comprised 76% of the US catch, while the US Pacific fishery comprised 24%, whereas, in the ten years after the regulation, the US Atlantic fishery comprised 34% of the US catch and the US Pacific fishery comprised 66%.
Overall, the level of total domestic swordfish landings was virtually unaffected by the Atlantic regulation because US fishing effort was transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Indeed, the total US swordfish catch continued to climb after 1990 in spite of the decrease in US Atlantic landings and did not decline until 1994-and then, only due to fluctuations in the US Pacific fishery landings.
The institution that mediated this transferred effect between the US Atlantic and US Pacific was the US swordfish market. Almost all US-caught swordfish is sold in the US [6] .
Domestic swordfish landings are allocated entirely to fresh consumption [5, 11, 12, 7] , while the remainder of US swordfish consumption is a combination of imported fresh and frozen The key question is: How did this sudden drop in US swordfish production affect US swordfish consumption, US swordfish imports, and non-US swordfish catch? Because US swordfish production is virtually all sold in the fresh US market, any transferred effect of the Hawaii closure on non-US fisheries would occur through the mechanism of the US market, appearing as a change in US fresh swordfish imports. Therefore, our analysis begins with an assessment of the effect of the Hawaiian closure on US consumption, US imports and indirectly on swordfish catch and production in other parts of the world. 3 Quantifying the effect of the Hawaiian closure on US consumption is complicated by confounding events. US swordfish consumption declined after 2000, as depicted in publicized by groups such as the Sea Turtle Restoration Network [15] .
The international supply of swordfish is spatially flexible, which facilitates a transfer of fishing effort. Global migration of pelagic fishing fleets is common [11, 16, 17, 18] . Several characteristics of the Hawaiian swordfish fishery would facilitate a movement of non-Hawaiian fishers into the space left by the regulated Hawaiian fishers. First, Hawaiian fishers may move to non-Hawaiian fisheries, or they may sell their boats and gear to non-Hawaiian fishers, which reduces startup costs for new fishers entering the market. Such movements have occurred in the past [7] . Second, swordfish is a highly migratory species, and there are a small number of stocks in the Pacific [19, 7] . This would mean that the reduction of catch by Hawaiian fisheries would cause an increase in fish available to other fisheries, which would increase their catch per unit effort, and attract more fishers to the market. Third, the fishing grounds frequented by Hawaiian longliners are largely international waters, and longliners often travel thousands of miles in fishing expeditions. Therefore, any decrease in effort by Hawaiian fishers might be compensated by foreign fishers working the same fishing grounds [7] .
Migrations of longline swordfish vessels are also common. In the late 1980s, responding to declining swordfish stocks in the Atlantic, almost 100 longline vessels-along with their crews-moved from the US East Coast to Hawaii [16] . Between 1989 and 1991, approximately 20 vessels moved from the US west coast to Hawaii [17] . In 1993, longline vessels moved from the US ports in the Gulf of Mexico to California, increasing the California fleet from 3 to 31 [6] .
In 2000, 40 Hawaiian vessels were unloading their swordfish catch in California ports [6] , and after the 2001 Hawaiian fishery closure 20 Hawaiian vessels relocated to California [20] . In identifying the specific location of the transferred swordfish catch, our analysis uses regions instead of countries. The country that exports swordfish to the US is not necessarily the country that caught the fish. After the fish is caught, it might be landed in a country different from the flag of the vessel that executed the catch, and after landing, it might be exported to another country before being exported to the US. There is no systematic tracking of swordfish catch in the years under investigation, so there is no way to be certain of the fishery that caught the fish imported into the US. 5 Accordingly, we have grouped countries into regions to minimize the effect of swordfish being transported across national boundaries.
To isolate those regions that responded most readily to an increase in US demand for foreign swordfish, we econometrically estimated a simultaneous system of demand and supply 
Empirical Model
The preceding analysis provides anecdotal evidence of a transferred effect, but it also reveals a potentially critical confounding factor. The decline in swordfish consumption may be the result of the Hawaiian closure, but it could also be the result of the demand-side forces, or some combination of the two. To sort out these confounding factors, it is necessary to construct a market model for swordfish demand and import supply.
The degree to which the Hawaiian closure would cause an increase in US imports may be affected by the own-price elasticity of demand for swordfish. If the demand is price-inelastic, this increases the likelihood of a transferred effect. Prior studies on demand for finfish have found that the demand is price inelastic. Consumer demand for high-value fresh fish (tuna, yellowtail, swordfish, flatfish, sea bream) has been analyzed for Japan. Japanese demand for fresh fish is important, because annual per capita consumption of high-value finfish in Japan (33.1 kg) is twice as high as per capita annual consumption in the E.U. (15.4 kg) and nearly three times as high as that in the US (13.3 kg). There is general agreement in these studies that demand for fresh fish is price inelastic, and recent estimates of the price elasticity of high-value fresh fish in Japan are in range -0.46 to -0.99 [21] . Studying the US market, Wellman [22] found that, "with the exception of shellfish, demand for the various fish products is relatively inelastic."
A key fact that enables us to partially distinguish demand from supply forces is that the Hawaiian catch was virtually all sold fresh in the US market. As a result, if the Hawaiian closure were to affect US swordfish consumption at all, it would affect the consumption of fresh and frozen swordfish differently. It might cause a decrease in fresh consumption, but it would not cause a decrease in frozen consumption. By contrast, the demand-side forces-in particular, the FDA advisory-would result in proportional effects in both fresh and frozen consumption.
Based on this reasoning, we specify two demand equations, one for US fresh swordfish and one for US frozen swordfish, and include in both equations a dummy variable In structuring our empirical model, we are guided by the work of Dale Squares and his colleagues [23, 24] , and the work on international trade for other fish species by Kinnucan and Myrland [25, 4, 26] as well as Sarmiento [14] on swordfish. In the latter model, Sarmiento [14] followed Enders et al [27] in estimating a transfer function for monthly individual country imports. Unfortunately, his analysis does not include swordfish price effect or any measure of fishing fleet flexibility for each country as explanatory variables. Moreover, given the dominant role of the US dollar as an international currency, there is no reason to expect exchange rates from convertible to nonconvertible currencies to have a significant multiplicative or additive effect [28] on import supply. The important question answered by the fresh import supply equations is whether the Hawaiian closure had a significant effect on import supply from any region from which the US imports fresh swordfish.
In specifying the market structure, all prices were measured at the border and the signals from current prices effect both demand and supply to the US fresh and frozen swordfish market.
There are, of course, a number of serious data limitations that reduce the richness of our specified model. In particular, there is no available stock data on swordfish in various parts of the world that can be included in the model. In addition, any proxy for income within the US market over the relevant period turns out to be basically nothing more than a time trend. In any event, prices are jointly determined by both demand and supply forces, where demand is specified internally within the borders of the United States, and supply responsiveness is largely confined to the rest of the world. 6 Given that the US fresh swordfish market is the mechanism through which any potential transferred effect might occur, the model to be estimated is composed of twelve equations. The model is designed with separate fresh import supply equations for each region that can feasibly respond in order to identify which regions, if any, significantly and economically increased exports to the US during the closure period. Equations (1) through (9) are the behavioral equations, equation (10) is an identity accounting the supply of fresh swordfish from all sources, and equations (11) and (12) are equilibrium conditions.
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Equation (1) is the same dummy variable described above for equation (1) . 
HAWAII
Given that domestic swordfish catch is sold entirely as fresh product, the supply of frozen swordfish to the US market is sourced entirely through imports. It follows that while equation (9) is the import supply of frozen swordfish to the US market, it also represents the complete supply of frozen swordfish to the US market. Equation (9) (10) is an identity accounting the composition of fresh swordfish supplied to the US market. Fresh swordfish supply is measured by the addition of the dependant variables in equations (3) through (8), and two exogenous variables not specified in the behavioral equations within the system, , and . Fresh swordfish imports from the rest-of-world is measured by . Rest-of-world includes Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and the Indian Ocean regions. Swordfish were not imported from these regions in each year during the data series used to estimate the behavioral equations, and as a result, imports from these regions are
treated as pre-determined. 7 Domestic fresh swordfish supply, , is also treated as predetermined because of the Total Allowable Catch in place for the Atlantic Ocean currently constrains the supply from this source and regulation in the Hawaiian region serves the same purpose during the closure/treatment period.
Equations (1) through (10) combined with Equations (11) and (12), the equilibrium conditions, represent the closed system. The quantity of fresh swordfish demanded is equated to the quantity of fresh swordfish supplied in equation (11), while the quantity of frozen swordfish demanded is equated to the quantity of frozen swordfish supplied by equation (12) .
Equations (1) and (2) are standard structural demand equations. Although fresh swordfish is thought to be a substitute for frozen swordfish, the data show that the products are not gross substitutes. The literature on substitution between fresh and frozen products of the same fish species has not come to any conclusion on the degree of substitution or complementarity. Asche, Salvanes and Steen [29] found fresh and frozen salmon to be gross substitutes using data from the EU market, while Wellman [22] found fresh and frozen finfish to be gross compliments. Due to exporters' ability to move fresh and/or frozen product to various markets, fresh import supply is specified as a function of current prices. Frozen import supply, represented in by equation (9), is also specified as a function of current prices in addition to lagged frozen import levels. We include lagged frozen imports in the frozen import supply Each of the estimated coefficients in equations (1) and (2) Further support for a transferred effect may be found by measuring the decline in US fresh and frozen swordfish consumption that occurred after 2000. Table 2 reports the average fresh and frozen consumption before and during the Hawaiian closure, and it calculates the percentage decline of each. This data shows that US fresh and frozen consumption declined at almost the same rate. This indicates that, while demand-side forces pushed both fresh and frozen consumption down, the Hawaiian closure did not have any additional effect on fresh consumption. After correcting for the downward shift in demand, the Hawaiian fresh swordfish supply was completely offset by an increase in foreign fresh swordfish supply.
Note that equations (3) and (5) America had significant swordfish catch in the Southern EPO (e.g., Panama), the entire EPO is the appropriate region for this analysis. As shown in Table 3 , there was an increase in swordfish catch in the EPO during the Hawaiian closure (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , the increase was concentrated in the Southern EPO (south of 5º longitude), and it was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
Transferred Effects
To estimate the degree of market shifting, we compare the actual fresh imports in the Pacific. Since our analysis found that the Central Eastern Pacific region is the only region with a significant increase in exports to the US during the period of the Hawaiian closure and jointly revealed a positive and significant estimated coefficient on the current landed price variable, it is reasonable to conclude that much of transferred swordfish catch is located in this region.
Accordingly, the transferred swordfish catch is equal to the difference between actual and but-for US imports from the Central Eastern Pacific region.
We estimated the degree of market shifting under three different demand conditions. First, we estimated it under the actual demand conditions. This initial estimate, while useful, may not be generalizable since the US demand was declining due to unusual demand-side factors that may not be sustainable. Therefore, we also estimated the degree of market shifting that would have occurred under two different "normal" demand conditions, where the US demand was not declining. This is a reasonable specification because, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 2 , non-Hawaiian domestic production did not increase in response to Hawaiian closures, possibly due to their already having reached regulatory limits. Under this method, actual fresh domestic catch quantities are used without modification (under the assumption that non-Hawaiian domestic production is at its regulatory limit). For this method, the transferred swordfish catch is estimated to be 2,712 mt. For this estimate, a 95% confidence interval of the transferred catch is 868 mt-2,337 mt (see Appendix B for the full analysis).
What are the effects of the swordfish market transfer on endangered sea turtles? The average net effect on sea turtles (NST) is calculated using the following equations: can be derived using values from the Hawaiian fishery during the period before the Hawaiian closure. 9 The remaining variables in (22)- (24) were derived using the best available data, as described in Table 4 [31, pp.6-7] . The rates for the two periods are listed in Table 7 .
These rates are based on a large number of observations. The method of collecting the data is reliable and thorough-indeed, in 2004-2006 the swordfish longline fishery had 100% onboard observer coverage. For C y B R , unfortunately there was no attempt to randomly sample fishing locations. The purpose of the IATTC research was not to estimate average bycatch rates but to compare the effects of circle hooks on bycatch rates. When a region produced low bycatch rates, the researchers often moved to other regions to collect data [33] . On the other hand, bycatch rates throughout the region are locally variable in space and time [33] , so low bycatch rates for a particular region in the past are not necessarily a predictor of low bycatch rates for that area in the future.
A comparison of the IATTC data for Costa Rica with other bycatch data from Costa Rica indicates that the IATTC data generates bycatch estimates that are conservative [34, p.62; 35, p.2; 36] . In addition to the IATTC study, one other study was used to estimate bycatch in this region [34] . There exist some other studies on turtle bycatch in the Central Eastern Pacific region, but for these observations either the fisheries did not target billfish (a category including swordfish) or they did not use shallow-set technology (depth of set is significantly associated with bycatch rate) [37, pp15-16; 38, p.19] .
The studies used to estimate the bycatch rate are summarized in Table 6 . For all of these studies, the bycatch was reported by independent shipboard observers. The IATTC presentation does not break these bycatch figures down by species of sea turtle. We took the average of the bycatch rate across these 17 studies and conducted a bootstrap nonparametric analysis to estimate the probability distribution. The average bycatch rate is 2.3460 turtles/1000 hooks (95% CI 0.1110-10.1146 turtles/1000 hooks).
Combining the data and estimates developed in this paper, Table 7 estimates the net effect of the Hawaiian fishery closure on sea turtle interactions. To estimate the but-for turtle interactions in Hawaii, Table 7 The critical parameters driving our results are: comparative bycatch rates in Hawaii and the EPO (especially the probability distribution of the bycatch rate in the EPO); the catch of targeted fish per unit of effort (CPUE); and the estimated transferred catch. For the first critical parameters, the average bycatch rate in Hawaii would have to be more than ten times greater than it actually was in order for the fishery closure to have a net salutary effect on sea turtles, all else constant. For the second critical parameter, as CPUE increases more target fish are caught per unit of effort. As revealed in Table 7 , if we use the upper confidence interval point for Hawaii and the EPO with the mean transferred catch, average weight of swordfish, and bycatch rate, the net effect on sea turtles is 2,018 mt, a figure that is 30% lower than reported in Table 7 .
If we use the lower confidence interval point for both Hawaii and the EPO, again with the same constant conditions, the net effect on sea turtles is 4,336 mt, 50% higher than the result reported in Table 7 . Finally, with regard to the estimated transferred catch, the results reported in Table 7 reveal that if the lower confidence interval point (868 mt), the net effect on sea turtles is 1,561 mt, 40% lower than what is reported in Table 7 . At the upper confidence interval point (transferred catch of 2,337 mt), all else constant, the net effect on sea turtles is 4,203 mt, 45% higher than the reported 2,882 mt in Table 7 .
These estimates of bycatch and mortality are conservative relative to those which appear elsewhere in the literature. This can be seen by a comparison of the resulting bycatch-to-catch ( / y B c ) rates. NMFS [7] estimates / 
Transferred swordfish catch (SSC)
The transferred swordfish catch is estimated in section 5.1. For brevity, we estimate the net effect on sea turtles using only the most conservative estimate of the transferred swordfish catch.
Average weight of swordfish (AWS)
The average weight of a Hawaiian-caught swordfish from 1992-2000 (the years with the highest percentage of swordfish-dedicated trips) was 0.0780 mt/fish (95% CI 0.0726-0.0835 mt/fish) [32, pp.3-46] .
CPUE in Hawaii
The target-fish catch per unit effort in the Hawaiian swordfish fishery is well established and is based on a significant amount of data. For the period between 1994-2002, it was 13.29 fish/1000 hooks (95% CI 12.89-13.73 fish/1000 hooks), and for the period 2004-2006, it was 15.42 fish/1000 hooks (95% CI 15.09-15.78 fish/1000 hooks) [31] .
CPUE in the Central Eastern Pacific region (
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission has conducted research on sea turtle bycatch in the shallow set fisheries in the Central Eastern Pacific. In addition to bycatch data, IATTC [35] collected data on target species CPUE. In the observed shallow-set fisheries, the target species were tuna, billfish, and shark. [35] . The study compares sea turtle bycatch rates in Tuna/Billfish/Shark shallow-set longline fisheries for two kinds of hooks (J-hooks and C16 circle hooks) in four countries: Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, and Peru. Fresh swordfish purchased. Measured as the weight of domestic production + fresh imports -fresh exports. Domestic production is not separated into fresh and frozen. Imported steaks, fillets and whole fresh swordfish reported in the trade data were aggregated. Evidence suggests domestic swordfish catch is marketed entirely as fresh product. Frozen swordfish purchased. Measured as frozen imports -frozen exports. Imported steaks, fillets and whole frozen swordfish reported in the trade data were aggregated.
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Thousands of pounds [B]
SWO F t i P , , 21 Average annual landed price of fresh swordfish imported into the US. Timeseries data on landed price levels of domestic product are not readily available. Landed prices were adjusted to constant 2000 dollars using an index of ex-vessel swordfish prices. Annual landed price of fresh salmon imported into the US Landed prices were adjusted to constant 2000 dollars using an index of ex-vessel salmon prices. Import prices were used as the price signal for landed fresh salmon prices in the US.
$ per pound
$ per pound [B], [C]
Annual landed price of frozen salmon imported into the US. Landed prices were adjusted to constant 2000 dollars using an index of ex-vessel salmon prices. Import prices were used as the price signal for landed frozen salmon prices in the US. Frozen swordfish imported from all regions in the current year. Measured as the weight of frozen swordfish imports. The entire domestic catch is marketed fresh; therefore the quantity of frozen swordfish supplied is sourced entirely through imports. Imported steaks, fillets and whole frozen swordfish reported in the trade data were aggregated.
$ per pound
Thousands of pounds
Annual landed price of frozen swordfish imported into the US during the current year. Landed prices were adjusted to constant 2000 dollars using an index of exvessel swordfish prices.
$ per pound [B], [C]
Frozen swordfish imported from all regions in during the prior year. Measured as the weight of frozen swordfish imports. The entire domestic catch is marketed fresh; therefore the quantity of frozen swordfish supplied is sourced entirely through imports. Imported steaks, fillets and whole frozen swordfish reported in the trade data were aggregated.
Thousands of pounds [B]
EPO t F 1 A proxy for production flexibility of the countries in fishing within the Central Eastern Pacific Ocean region. Flex was computed as follows: Each country that sourced catch from the Central Eastern Pacific Ocean region at any point during 1990-2005 were identified within the data. The total annual catch of those countries in each ocean region was then computed, and the percentage of the total catch that was sourced from the Central Eastern Pacific Ocean region was then calculated. The first difference of the percentage was taken to represent the annual change. 
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